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We are surrounded by machines. From simple ones—AC motors and transform-
ers—through radio receivers, TV sets, smartphones and personal computers, to
sophisticated AI systems, such as self-driving cars, autonomous weapons and IBM’s
Watson. The advances in technology have reshaped the world we inhabit, including
our social environment. When iPhone is the girl’s best friend, our communication
and decision-making is aided by complex algorithms, and various tasks so far
reserved for human beings are carried out by robots, the contemporary societies are
not what they used to be. Moreover, the technology is advancing at such a rapid
pace that many ideas, such as companion and sex robots, which used to be a fodder
for science fiction are fast becoming a reality.
This is a profound challenge for any legal system. The law is there to regulate the
actions of individuals so that they contribute to the functioning of large societies. It
means that legal institutions should be designed in such a way as to embrace any
changes and developments that reshape our communal practices. For this reason,
technological progress has been a focus of lawyers’ debates since the first industrial
revolution. The great discoveries of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—car,
airplane, radio, TV, computer, the Internet—have not only influenced the existing
legal institutions, but have also led to the establishment of entirely new branches of
law. Arguably, however, they did not revamp the very foundations of their
contemporary legal systems, but served as a means for regulating interactions
between human beings. Technology has been considered only as a tool used by
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human actors—a tool capable of changing the nature of our interactions, but a tool
nevertheless.
This situation has changed dramatically with the introduction of autonomous
machines, which are reactive (they respond in a timely fashion to changes in the
environment), autonomous (they exercise control over their own actions and are not
directly controlled by any other agent), goal-oriented (they act in a purposeful way
and do not simply react in response to the environment), and temporally continuous
(they are always running). The question emerges whether—from the legal
perspective—such machines should remain ‘tools’ in the hands of human actors,
or whether they should rather be considered genuine legal patients or agents. This
problem lies at the very heart of the law: should we start thinking about
reconceptualising the foundations of our legal systems, granting autonomous
machines the status (or, at least, a partial status) so far reserved for human beings?
The papers collected in this special issue of ‘Artificial Intelligence and Law’ all
address some aspect of the aforementioned problem. Three of them—J. Hage’s, J.
J. Bryson, TD Grant, and ME Diamantis’, and B. Bro _zek and M. Jakubiec’s—
attempt to spell out the conditions for granting autonomous machines the status of a
legal agent. Hage argues that it is possible to hold autonomous agents themselves,
and not only their makers, users or owners, responsible for their acts. He claims that
there are no metaphysical or conceptual barriers to make such an attribution of
agency impossible, and that the question of whether autonomous systems should be
considered legally responsible is a purely utilitarian question: if such a legal
manoeuvre is considered beneficial, it would be fully justified.
On the other hand, Bryson, Grant and Diamantis argue that it is not
contestable that autonomous machines can be granted legal personhood, since it
is a conventional conceptual construct, and that the decision to do so should be
determined purely by its consequences. However, they further argue that the
potential costs of granting autonomous systems the status of a legal agent seem to
outweigh the foreseeable benefits.
Bro _zek and Jakubiec take a slightly different stance. They also acknowledge that
it is technically possible to consider autonomous machines as legal agents; however,
they claim that such a manoeuvre would be ineffective for conceptual reasons. The
conceptual apparatus regarding legal responsibility is well rooted in folk psychology
(the way people conceptualise, understand and explain their actions and the actions
of other people), and it is difficult to see how the actions of artificial agents can be
incorporated into the folk-psychological model of agency.
In their paper, L. Frank and S. Nyholm consider a more concrete problem
connected to the agency of autonomous machines: whether it is conceivable,
possible, and desirable that humanoid robots should be designed in such a way that
they are capable of consenting to sex? They discuss reasons for both positive and
negative answers to this question, taking into account such problems as the concept
of consent in general, and the relationships between consent and free will and
between consent and consciousness.
The following three papers deal with a different aspect of the main problem
addressed in this volume—what should be the inner architecture of autonomous
machines so that they may follow the law and be considered legally (or morally)
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responsible for their actions. F. Podschwadek considers the question of what would
be the requirements of an autonomous moral agent. He argues that a full moral
autonomy implies the option of deliberately acting immorally, not merely through
an error in identifying the morally correct action in a given situation. In other words,
such artificial moral agents would have the potential for moral fallibility, i.e. for
rejecting the moral system they are to follow altogether.
H. Prakken, in turn, considers the main problems connected with designing
autonomous vehicles that respect the traffic law. He observes that traffic regulations,
although quite simple and precise in comparison to other areas of the law, generate a
number of troublesome issues for an artificial system. They include vagueness,
specific and general exceptions, and the role of the principles of civil liability as
providing indirect cues for the behaviour of an autonomous vehicle. Further,
Prakken describes three approaches to developing the logical architecture of an
autonomous vehicle (regimentation, reasoning, and learning), and discusses the
abilities an autonomous vehicle must have in light of the requirements of the traffic
regulations (e.g., complex object recognition). He also addresses the problem of
knowledge representation, and highlights the difficulty connected with interpreting
legal provisions.
Finally, G. Contissa, F. Lagioia, and G. Sartor address the problem of legal
responsibility connected to accidents involving autonomous vehicles. In particular,
they consider some scenarios in which an autonomous vehicle faces a situation
similar to the notorious trolley problem. They claim that such a situation would lead
to serious troubles when it comes to ascribing legal responsibility, and propose to
remedy them by equipping the autonomous vehicle with a device (The Ethical
Knob), which would enable its user to choose the ‘ethical mode’ of the car’s
behaviour (e.g., egoistic, impartial or altruistic). In this case, the ‘decisions’ of the
vehicle would—ultimately—be the decisions of the user, making the ascription of
criminal liability possible. They also consider a more complex solution when the
Ethical Knob has a continuous rather than a discrete setting.
We hope that the papers collected in this volume will contribute to the ongoing
debates pertaining to the legal status of autonomous machines. We thank all the
contributors and the reviewers for their effort and cooperation.
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